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Abstract
This paper analyses the efficiency of a set of environmental measures introduced by
the 11th FYP (Five Years Plan) in China in 2006, using a rich and unique dataset
borrowed from the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and from the State
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). The objective is to provide new evidence of
the Soft Budget Constraint (SBC), which is a key concept coined by Janos Kornai. The
main finding is that TCZ (Two Control Zone) cities are successful in bringing down
the emission of SO2, and more importantly that this success is driven by the private
sector. Sectors dominated by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are less sensitive to the
environmental target-based evaluation system, by a factor of 42%. We also find that
one channel, through which this adjustment takes place, is Total Factor Productivity
(TFP), but not in the case of SOEs. We interpret these results as pointing to the
evidence of a still ongoing SBC surrounding Chinese SOEs.
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1 Introduction
The case of China offers an illustration of the dilemma many nations face between the
objectives concerning development and poverty reduction on the one hand and those of
fighting against pollution on the other. Environmental protection is sometimes at odds with
poverty reduction, as the steps required to reduce poverty may entail a cost in terms of
pollution to build infrastructure and stimulate economies. Despite this cost, in 2005, China
launched a set of vigorous measures aimed at combatting growth-induced pollution and
environmental degradation. The question to be addressed here is whether this voluntary
approach is sufficient and whether it can bring about the desired outcomes.
The Chinese model of development is characterized by its dualism (Vahabi, 1995), as
a model of federalism that implies a specific trade-off between political cost and economic
benefit seen in the still ongoing planning of the economy and the concomitant liberalization of
market forces (Berglof and Roland, 1998; Qian and Roland, 1998). As a consequence, China’s
political decision to reduce growth-induced pollution emissions is rooted in its FYP (Five
Years Plan) strategy and the enforcement of political objectives by the central government,
which aims at keeping pollution under control. Is its approach efficient? This paper provides
an answer to this question. It stresses the relative efficiency of state regulation by highlighting
the strength of Chinese firms’ policy-induced responses.
Moreover, this paper also shows that, while private firms have been sensitive to the new
environmental targets and have made significant reductions in their emissions of pollutants,
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have not taken similar steps. SOEs’ inaction in this regard
has been widely viewed as an outcome of the ’soft budget constraint’ (SBC) (Kornai et al.,
2003). It is a term initially coined by Janos Kornai (1993; 1995; 1998; 2001), who referred
to the phenomenon of bailing-out loss-making firms that consequently undermines ex-ante
incentives.
The concept of the SBC sees a straightforward application to the objective of sustainable
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growth: under the condition that they have rational expectations to be refinanced, as in the
case of SOEs, enterprises will not be motivated to reach their objective of reducing pollution.
Furthermore, the presence of the SBC among certain groups of enterprises (SOEs) implies
that there is a harder budget constraint for other enterprises. In reference to the case of
former Yugoslavia, Kraft and Vodopivec (1992) demonstrate that, while the manufacturing
sector was a net beneficiary of redistribution, its SBC was compensated for by a harder
budget constraint in the private business sector.
This reasoning holds in many other circumstances, as are described in this paper, which
establishes that private firms have to adjust and decrease pollution more vigorously than
they should need to, in order to compensate for the weak restructuring and weak adoption
of green innovations by SOEs. A final but significant element to be discussed is innovation,
and research and development (R&D). Interestingly, Huang and Xu (1998) argue that SOEs
and large corporations tend to maintain the stability of their RD organizations.
The lack of effective ex-post screening mechanisms in large corporations and SOEs makes
them tend to choose safer innovative projects. In contrast, green projects are usually risky
and are more likely to be undertaken by small or private firms. It translates to private firms
benefiting from higher returns from environmental incentives than SOEs.
The objective of this paper is as follows. First, it intends to evaluate the efficiency of
the new environmental policy launched during the 11th FYP, by paying particular attention
to cities targeted by the central government, called TCZ cities. Are the industries located
in those cities, particularly the most polluting ones, more successful in fighting against
pollution and meeting the new targets in terms of pollution reduction? Second, the paper
examines whether SOEs behave differently as compared with private firms. We expect that
SOEs will invest a lower amount of resources in meeting the requirements imposed by the
environmental policy. We start the analysis by presenting the main characteristics of the
Chinese environmental policy before 2006 and up to 2010, which corresponds to the period
of our dataset.
2
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Then, in the following section, we discuss the empirical specification and the dataset.
Section 3 sets-up the empirical analysis, main results, robustness checks. Section 6 develops
the transmission mechanisms by paying special attention to the impact of environmental
policies on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and we distinguish TFP for private firms as
opposed to SOEs. Finally, this paper concludes in Section 7.
2 Policy Background
The Chinese policymakers decided to take the environmental issue seriously after the sulfur
dioxide (SO2) peak hurt the country in 1995. In no less than three years, the officials
in Beijing proposed and ratified a law regulating SO2 emissions. In 1998, the ’Acid Rain
Control Zones and Sulfur Dioxide Pollution Control Zones’ policy, abbreviated as ’Two
Control Zone’ (TCZ), was implemented by the central government, to control the emissions
of this pollutant.
While the regulation of SO2 emissions was initially designed to be implemented at the
national level, the State Council subsequently chose 175 cities with very poor environmental
records to engage with more effort. Three selection criteria were decided according to the
environmental performance preceding the regulations. A city was placed under scrutiny if the
average annual ambient SO2 concentration was higher than the national Class II standard
(0.06mg/m3), if the daily average ambient SO2 concentration exceeded the national Class
3
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III standard (0.25mg/m3)1, or if the city experienced significant SO2 emissions 2.
These 175 cities are primarily concentrated in two areas: northern China, due to the
heavy reliance on coal to power the heating system, and southern China, where the urban-
industrial centres emit substantial air pollution and are the source of severe acid rains. These
TCZ cities cover 1.09 million square kilometres, in 27 provinces, and they account for 11.4%
of the whole of China’s territory.
At the national level, the objectives were the following: the emissions of SO2 were ex-
pected to decrease successively in 2000 and 2010, and a special role was devoted to TCZ
cities, which were granted the responsibility of achieving the national Class II standard of
0.06mg/m3. The quota of SO2 emissions set by the central government in 2000 should not
exceed 24.6 million tonnes – compared with 23.7 million tonnes in 1997 – and emissions in
2010 were expected to decrease even more than emissions in 2000. In 2001, the policymak-
ers strengthened the consistency of the environmental policy called the control policy in the
10th Five-Year-Plan (FYP) (2001-2005). Objectives were set at the national level while their
implementation and enforcement were left at the TCZ cities’ level.
TCZ cities were allowed to use four methods to achieve pollution reduction targets.
They could shut down polluting plants, install new equipment, use cleaner-burning coal
and implement stringent monitoring devices. All power stations with a capacity lower than
1China uses its air quality standard, which is less stringent than the WHO’s standard. China’s National
Environmental Monitoring Center (CNEMC) has real-time, hourly air quality data for major cities in China.
The real-time data is available at . Major air pollutants, including SO2, NO2, and PM10, are monitored. To
evaluate air quality, the Chinese government applies three classes. Class 1 means the yearly SO2 level is less
than 0.02 mg/m3, or a daily average of less than 0.05mg/m3. Class 2 is less restrictive. The yearly average
should not exceed 0.06 and a daily average of about 0.15. Class 3 is consistent with bad air quality. The
yearly average can exceed 0.10 mg/m3, and the daily average is 0.25. By contrast, the WHO recommends a
daily average of less than 0.02mg/m3. For the record, exposure to high SO2 levels dangerously affects health.
According to the WHO ’SO2 can affect the respiratory system and the functions of the lungs and causes
irritation of the eyes. Inflammation of the respiratory tract causes coughing, mucus secretion, aggravation
of asthma, and chronic bronchitis and makes people more prone to infections of the respiratory tract.’
2A city was designated as an acid rain control zone if:
1. its average PH value of precipitation was equal or smaller than 4.5;
2. its sulfate deposition was above the critical load;
3. its SO2 emissions were large.
4
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50,000 kilowatts, or collieries fueled by coal with a sulfur content of 3%, had to be shut
down 3. Furthermore, the central government had the power to cancel construction projects
that did not fit the objective of lower SO2 emissions. Industrial plants were forced to meet
the environmental standards by installing higher-capacity (more expensive) pollution control
equipment 4. Finally, the government carefully monitored the purchase of fuel oil by firms
located in TCZ cities. The transportation department was given the charge of supplying
fuel oil with a sulfur concentration of less than 2% or coal with a sulfur concentration of less
than 1%.
The first evaluations of the policy were run in 2000, as reported in Table 1. The emissions
of SO2 rose again after a short drop in 1998-1999. By the end of 2000, 102 TCZ cities reached
the national Class II standard, while the total industrial SO2 emissions increased by 12%
compared with the previous year 5. The entry of China into the WTO in 2001 launched
a process of massive industrialisation, economic growth and reduction of poverty 6, which
was at odds with the achievement of the objective of stricter control over pollution. The
consequences of the lack of coordination and the focus on economic growth from the local
government led to a historical peak of SO2 emissions in 2005.
The poor results of the environmental policy were attributed to the design of the policy
itself. Its main flaw was that the objectives set at the national level were not restrictive
enough at the local level. As a result economic growth was strongly emphasised by the
central government, which did not provide local municipalities with the incentives to enforce
not only economic growth, but also control over pollution. Most of the time, those objectives
turned out to be contradictory and could not be achieved contemporaneously (Barbier and
3338 small power units, 784 product lines in small cement and glass plants, 404 lines in iron and steel
plants, and 1422 additional pollution sources had closed and by May 2001, 4492 high-sulfur coal mines had
ceased production in the TCZ area (He et al., 2002)
4The second policy is the installation of flue gas desulfurization (FGD) equipment on new and existing
coal-fired power plants. At the end of 2005, FGD equipment had been installed on 46.2 GW of coal-fired
electricity generation capacity—12 percent of the total (Cao et al., 2009)
584.3% of the most polluting firms achieved the national target in terms of SO2 emissions (China Envi-
ronment Yearbook, 2001)
6The WTO membership allows China to achieve some millennium goals
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Burgess, 2019; Brajer et al., 2011; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Lee and Oh, 2015).
Table 1: SO2 reduction during the subsequent FYPs
Failure Success
(1998-2000) (2001-2005) (2006-2010)
TCZ
SO2 target - - -14%
SO2 % reduction -7% 38% -15%
No TCZ
SO2 target - - -4%
SO2 % reduction 21% 64% -11%
All sample
SO2 target - -10% -10%
SO2 % reduction -2% 45% -13%
Sources: Author’s own computation
The list of TCZ is provided by the State Council, 1998. ”Official Reply to the State Council
Concerning Acid Rain Control Areas and Sulfur Dioxide Pollution Control Areas”. The in-
formation about the SO2 level are collected using various edition of the China Environment
Statistics Yearbook. We compute the reduction of SO2 emission using the same methodology
as Chen and al.(2018).
In 2006, the central government reconsidered its strategy, changing from a top-down to
a bottom-up approach. The two main differences introduced in the 11th FYP (2006-2010)
compared with the previous FYP (2001-2005) are the formulation of transparent environ-
mental targets for each TCZ city and the introduction of an environmental target-based
evaluation system for the promotion and career achievement of local officials. This target-
based evaluation system aims at promoting the efforts toward the objectives considered to
be priorities by the central government. It provides a tool for measuring the success of the
local administration, making them accountable. The threat imposed by Beijing forces the
mayors and party secretaries to adhere to the national policy.
Local officials in TCZ cities paid more attention to the environmental prejudice of eco-
6
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nomic growth. This new emphasis on environmental concerns from both the central and local
governments was followed by immediate and measurable consequences: over 2006 to 2010
the average growth rate of SO2 emissions fell by -14% (see Table 1), and most TCZ cities
(95%) were able to reach the national Class II standard SO2 concentration, with no cities
reporting values above the national Class III standard (Report of Ministry of Environmental
Protection of the Peoples Republic of China, 2011).
3 Empirical Specification
Our identification strategy is based upon two key elements embodied in the 11th FYP.
Indeed, by establishing a clear distinction between TCZ versus non-TCZ cities, the 11th
FYP allows us to define a group of treated and control cities. While the treated group
(TCZ) is expected to fulfill a set of environmental objectives and is under close governmental
scrutiny, the other group (non-TCZ) is not. Moreover, the sharp change in the environmental
strategy impulsed by the central government in 2006 split the time span into two sub-periods
7: 2001-2005 corresponding to the 10th FYP and 2006-2010 corresponding to the 11th FYP
and the enforcement of the environmental policy. This double characteristic enables us to
run a difference-in-difference (DD) analysis.
One concern about this strategy is the influence of the most polluting industries on the
probability of a city being designated as a TCZ city. If such a relationship holds, it means
that the TCZ policy influences the pattern of SO2 emissions. Still, the presence of firms
in the most polluting industries determines the other way around the level of pollution and
the probability of being qualified as a TCZ city. To address the resulting endogeneity bias,
we add an interaction term, which is the TCZ policy times the 11th FYP period times a
dummy capturing the most polluting industries in China.
China’s political pecking order of firms is enforced through the systematic misallocation of
7As mentioned in section 2 Policy Background; the TCZ policy ended in 2010.
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financial resources (Dollar and Wei, 2007) with credit allocation being biased in favor of SOEs
(Brandt and Li, 2003; Ferri and Liu, 2009; Hale and Long, 2011; Huang, 2003), whatever
their compliance with the governmental objectives of the FYP. SOEs in China enjoy easier
access to credit. They also benefit from more substantial bargaining power when it comes
to negotiating the pollution tax system (Wang et al., 2003; Wang and Wheeler, 2005). As
a result, SOEs are less sensitive to the environmental regulation hardening because of their
stronger bargaining power and easier access to bank funding.
To assess this lower sensitivity, besides the spatial, industrial, and time dimensions, we
add a last but not least ownerships variable – SOEs versus private firms. We argue that
SOEs are less likely to react to the environmental regulation because of the soft budget
constraint, which dampens the incentive of fighting against pollution and shifts the burden
of the environmental adaptation to private companies 8. The spatial variable captures the
SO2 emissions for TCZ versus non-TCZ cities. The industrial variable controls for the bias of
having more TCZ cities, be where the most polluting industries are located. The time divide
measures the effect of the introduction of more stringent and accountable environmental
objectives after 2006 and the launch of the 11th FYP.
The following is the final specification, its difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD)
design accounts for the four levels of variability:
Log SO2 emission ikt =α(TCZi × Polluting sectors k × Period )
+ β(TCZi × Polluting sectors k × Period × Share SOE k)
+ θXikt + νik + λit + φkt + ikt
(1)
Where Log SO2 emission ikt is the level of SO2 in city i, industry k and at time t. The
equation includes four right-hand-side variables of interest, a set of control variables and
8This DDD strategy is used to tackle the endogeneity problem. Regarding Chinese empirical studies,
one can refer to Chen et al. (2018); Shi and Xu (2018); Hering and Poncet (2014) or Cai et al. (2016)
8
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fixed effects. TCZi reflects the TCZ policy implemented in 1998 and amended in 2005.
Polluting sectors k is a dummy variable taking the value one for heavily polluting industries
k, and zero for less polluting ones. Period is a dummy variable, which is set equal to one
when t is strictly above 2005. Share SOE k refers to a proxy for the relative share of SOEs
in industry k.
We add three control variables usually found in the literature (Andersen, (2016; 2017)),
which are the total outputikt, total fixed assetikt, and employmentikt aggregated at the city
i, industry k and time t. The equation includes a city-year fixed effect φit, which controls
for all city characteristics that differ across cities over time, such as productivity, policies
and wages. λkt is an industry-time pair fixed effect which captures the time-varying and
time-invariant industry characteristics, e.g., industry-specific technology and government’s
industrial policies. With the inclusion of fixed effects νik, we address the time invariant
differences between the cities’ industries, which are key in our approach: while industrial
policies are decided at the central level for the whole country, local municipalities orchestrate
their implementation differently from one city to another. In our equation, ikt represents
the error term. This strategy allows us to isolate the effect of stricter environmental policies
affecting TCZ cities before and after the 11th FYP. More importantly for the purpose at
hand, it allows us to compare the sensitivity of the firm’s ownership to the enforcement of
the environmental regulation, on the emissions of SO2.
We expect the coefficient α to be negative and β to be positive. TCZ cities emit less
SO2 after 2005 in more polluting industries with a larger presence of private firms because
policymakers put more pressure on them, while SOEs enjoy a softer budget constraint, hence
cope more easily with the regulation. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered by
industry.
9
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4 Data
Our key interest is the SO2 emissions, which are available at the city–industry–year level.
Using various data sources, we construct a dataset including environmental, industrial and
economic information at the city–industry–year level over the period 2002 to 2007.
4.1 SO2 emissions
The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) has mandated the State Environmental
Protection Agency (SEPA) to collect data on the primary sources of pollutants and waste
in China since 1980. The SEPA has monitored firms in 39 major industrial sectors that
are considered to be heavy polluters. These firms are required to report basic information,
such as company name, address, and output. They also answer a very detailed questionnaire
about their emissions of major pollutants (e.g. wastewater, COD, SO2, industrial smoke,
and dust).
As reported by Wu et al. (2017) and by Jiang et al. (2014), the resulting dataset embodies
85% of the emissions of the major pollutants in China. The MEP has implemented strict
procedures, such as unexpected visits from experts, to ensure that firms do not misreport
their emissions. Having access to the statistics of SO2, a primary air pollutant, our left-
hand side variable is Log SO2 emission ikt, which is the logarithm of S02 emissions in city
i, industry k, and year t, for 296 four-digits industries, across 228 cities from 2002 to 2007.
We define Polluting sectors k equal to one when an industry emits more than 68,070 tonnes
of SO2 (top 25% most polluting sectors).
The emissions of SO2 reached a peak in 2005 at 32.41 million tonnes (China Statistical
Yearbook on Environment, 2005). Out of the 522 cities monitored by the Chinese Ministry
of Environment, about 400 reported an annual average level of SO2 that met the Grade
10
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II national standard (0.06mg/m3) and 33 cities met the worst grade (0.10mg/m3). Two
years after the 11th FYP was launched, the situation had slightly changed, according to the
Ministry of Environment in its annual report on the state of the environment in China 9. 79%
of the audited cities met Grade II, which is two percentage points better than in 2005. In
regards to the Grade III criteria, less than 1.2% of the cities were above the threshold, which
corresponds to an improvement of four percentage points from 2005. The most polluted
cities are located in Shanxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan provinces.
4.2 Ownership
The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) distinguishes manufacturing data with
sales above RMB 5 million for non-SOEs and SOEs. The survey contains detailed informa-
tion about the name, address, four-digit Chinese industrial classification (CIC), ownership,
financial variables, output, sales, fixed assets, etc.
For share SOEk, we rely on three proxies. The first is SOEs industrial average share
of output (output share SOEk). Alternatively, we compute the SOEs industrial average
share of employment (labour share SOEk), and capital (capital share SOEk). For instance,
the output of the tobacco industry is almost entirely produced by SOEs (96%), while the
transport equipment industry is more balanced with only 40% of the output produced by
SOEs.
4.3 Two Control Zone
In 1998, the State Council launched a vast policy to curb SO2 emissions and to reduce the
acid rain. There were 175 cities called TCZ cities located in 27 provinces designated to
provide the subsequent effort for controlling SO2 emissions. Out of the 228 cities in our
9The report is available here
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dataset, 140 are qualified as TCZ cities. Table 10 in the appendix provides the list of TCZ
cities present in our dataset. TCZi is a dummy set equal to one if city i belongs to this list.
Table 2: Summary statistics by city-industry and city characteristics
Panel A: City/city-industry
No TCZ TCZ
mean std mean std
SO2ikt 182,873 372,028 174,308 357,225
count share SOEk 0.093 0.094 0.082 0.086
output share SOEk 0.147 0.153 0.136 0.151
capital share SOEk 0.220 0.197 0.209 0.198
labour share SOEk 0.188 0.162 0.176 0.162
outputkit 0.028 0.101 0.058 0.266
capitalkit 0.008 0.030 0.014 0.054
labourkit 0.009 0.024 0.016 0.056
Panel B: SO2 emission by city-location
difference (10.000 tons units) variance (%)
No TCZ TCZ No TCZ TCZ
Location
Full sample -192 -436 0.22 0.26
Central -238 -232 0.25 0.19
Coastal -138 -659 0.12 0.29
Northeast -206 -89 0.30 0.08
Northwest -115 -277 0.21 0.31
Southwest -272 -503 0.31 0.29
Non Coastal -215 -302 0.28 0.23
Coastal -140 -578 0.13 0.28
Sources: Author’s own computation
Panel A provides summary statistics for the main variables used in the subsequent empirical
analysis.
Panel B provides summary statistics for the SO2 emission (in 10.000 tons) for Chinese cities
(228), split into TCZ (140) and non-TCZ (88) cities
Table 2 Panel A provides information about the characteristics of TCZ and non-TCZ
cities. Not only do TCZ cities emit less SO2 over the entire period, but they are also wealth-
ier and more populated. The reason behind the lower level of SO2 emissions is twofold.
First, TCZ cities are, by definition, making more effort to execute stringent environmental
regulations. Second, the relationship between wealth and the demand for cleaner environ-
12
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mental goods is known to be positive. In the Chinese case, the evidence is provided in Hering
and Poncet (2014). TCZ and richer cities should therefore emit less SO2. In section 5.3,
robustness checks section, we include yearly GDP per capita and population at the city level.
The data are borrowed from the China City Statistical Yearbooks 2002–2007.
Panel B (Table 2) displays a regional break down of SO2 emissions for TCZ versus
non-TCZ cities and for both periods (before and after the 11th FYP). We note that the
emissions of SO2 have decreased in both TCZ and non-TCZ cities after the implementation
of the 11th FYP. TCZ cities have contributed more to the overall decrease with a reduction
by four points higher than non-TCZ cities (or 436 fewer tonnes of SO2 for TCZ versus 191
for non-TCZ).
Furthermore, Panel B also gives a more in-depth overview of the SO2 reduction in the
major areas of China. Following Wu et al. (2017), we split the cities between Coastal,
Southwest, Central, Northeast, and Northwest areas 10. In our sample, the Coastal area
of China is composed of ten provinces and has a total of 68 TCZ cities. This area is the
wealthiest part of China: it represents the lion’s share of national production and attracts
the most significant foreign investment flows.
The Southwestern area has five provinces and 24 TCZ cities, while the Central area has
six provinces and 38 TCZ cities. The Northern part of China is split into its Western area
with six provinces and 13 TCZ cities and Eastern area with three provinces and 11 TCZ
cities.
By the end of the 11th FYP, TCZ cities located in the Coastal and Northwest parts of
China have been more successful than non-TCZ cities in reducing their SO2 emissions. By
contrast, TCZ cities located in the Central part of China have not performed better than
non-TCZ cities (the decrease of SO2 emissions has been -231 for the former and -238 for the
10This province breakdown follows the paper of Wu et al. (2017). The Central provinces are Anhui,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Shanxi. The Coastal provinces are Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan
Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. The Northeastern provinces are Heilongjiang,
Jilin, Liaoning. Northwest are Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang. The
Southwestern parts are Chongqing, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Xizang.
13
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latter).
4.4 Control variables
The literature has listed the key determinants of environmental degradation at the firm level
(see, for instance, Cole and Elliott, 2003 and Cole et al, 2008). Capital intensity affects
both the emissions and intensity of pollution (Hering and Poncet, 2014; Andersen, 2017).
Firms’ size matters: large industries emit more pollutants. The sectoral belonging matters
as well, and we use NBS industrial classification to sort firms according to the sector they
belong to. We rely on the 2002 four-digit CIC and compute total employment, total output,
and total net fixed assets, aggregated at the city-industry-year level. The information is
generated from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) conducted by China’s NBS
for the period from 2003 - 2007. As reflected in Table 2 (Panel A), TCZ cities produce and
employ more resources.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Main results
Table 3 reports the results of equation 1. The coefficient of interest measures the effect
of the environmental policy on the emissions of SO2 in the polluting sectors, with a par-
ticular emphasis on sectors dominated by SOEs. The triple interaction terms (TCZi ×
Polluting sectors k × Period ) estimates are all negative and significant, meaning that SO2
emissions felt more significantly in TCZ cities than in non-TCZ cities after the launch of the
11th FYP, in line with our expectations.
Our key assumption is that the effectiveness of the policy is lower in sectors dominated by
14
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SOEs, which face a softer budget constraint. We expect, therefore a less negative coefficient
(smaller in absolute value) for those sectors. To test this assumption we interact TCZi ×
Polluting sectors k × Period with the three proxies of the firms’ ownerships: in column 1
are SOEs’ industrial output share, in columns 2 and 3 are SOEs’ share of capital or labour
respectively. The four coefficients of interest are all positive and significant, meaning that
the policy is attenuated in the polluting sectors where the presence of SOEs is strong. Those
firms enjoy preferential treatment and can adopt business strategies less constrained by the
new regulation than private firms. They do not need to reduce, cut or relocate the production
because they receive financial support from the local government. Softer credit constraint
helps them to absorb the costs linked to the policy more efficiently.
The control system implemented by the 11th FYP significantly decreases the emission of
SO2. The coefficient of TCZi× Polluting sectors k× Period takes two values: -.29 (column
1) and -.37 (column 3), which represents a reduction of SO2 ranging from respectively -7,629
(29% of the average SO2 emissions of a city polluting industry) to -9,652 tonnes (37%)11.
The output share of SOEs in the polluting sectors varies from 1.3% to 33%. Also, given
the estimates of equation 1 in Table 3, the environmental policy’s effect is smaller where the
state size is more prominent. According to a straightforward formula12, it is smaller by 42%.
This decline in policy efficiency is imputable to the soft budget constraint.
Other control variables have the expected signs: economic growth has severely degraded
the environment; GDP, employment and fixed assets are correlated with more emissions of
SO2. The inclusion of these variables does not affect the main coefficient of interest.
11The average 2005 emissions of SO2 for the polluting industries k located in city i is equal to 25.603
tonnes, the reduction of pollution is straightforward: −.298 ∗ 25.603 = −7, 629 tonnes for column 2, and
−.377 ∗ 25.603 = −9, 652 for columns 3. These figures are comparable to the official figures which refers to
the whole economy, see table 1.
12The formula is β ∗ (output share SOE90 percentilethk − output share SOE10 percentile
th
k ) when β is equal to
1.315: 42% = 1.135 ∗ (0.33− 0.013) table 3 column 1.
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Table 3: Soft budget constraint as reflected in the SOEs’ reaction to the TCZ
policy in China: Baseline result
The Dependent variable: Ln SO2ikt
Output Capital Labour
(1) (2) (3)
outputikt −0.059 −0.059 −0.059
(0.114) (0.114) (0.113)
capitalikt 0.929
∗ 0.933∗∗ 0.937∗∗
(0.476) (0.475) (0.474)
labourikt 1.550 1.545 1.538
(1.023) (1.023) (1.021)
TCZi × Pollutingk × Period −0.298∗∗ −0.336∗∗ −0.377∗∗
(0.142) (0.154) (0.154)
TCZi × output share SOEk × Period −0.824
(0.515)
TCZi × Pollutingk × output share SOEk × Period 1.315∗∗
(0.609)
TCZi × capital share SOEk × Period −0.682∗
(0.399)
TCZi × Pollutingk × capital share SOEk × Period 1.065∗∗
(0.513)
TCZi × labour share SOEk × Period −1.020∗∗
(0.518)
TCZi × Pollutingk × labour share SOEk × Period 1.532∗∗
(0.598)
city-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
city-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,676 30,676 30,676
R2 0.851 0.851 0.851
Note: ∗p<0.1 ∗∗p<0.05 ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroskedastiikty-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city
5.2 Testing for parallel trends
We must check that our strategy satisfies the parallel trends assumption, by showing that
TCZ and non-TCZ cities have a similar SO2 emissions trajectories before the treatment
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(i.e., before the introduction of stringent environmental regulations). One might think for
instance, that certain local governments anticipated the implementation of the environmental
regulation and decided to enforce it before the treatment year. The test for the parallel trend
assumption consists of replacing the treatment variable Period with yearly dummies. The
new specification becomes:
Log SO2 emission ikt =
2007∑
t=2002
α(TCZi × Polluting sectors k × yeart)
+θXikt + νik + λit + φkt + ikt
(2)
In which yeart is a dummy set equal to one with t ranging from the year 2002 to 2007.
Table 4: Parallel trends
The Dependent variable: Ln SO2ikt
(1) (2) (3)
(All sample) (TCZ) (No TCZ)
(TCZi × Pollutingk × Y ear) (Pollutingk × Y ear) (Pollutingk × Y ear)
2003 −0.409 −0.091 0.228
(0.272) (0.115) (0.259)
2004 −0.253 −0.098 0.078
(0.287) (0.112) (0.308)
2005 −0.420 −0.153 0.178
(0.263) (0.127) (0.272)
2006 −0.503∗ −0.211 0.159
(0.270) (0.129) (0.288)
2007 −0.460 −0.246∗ 0.127
(0.303) (0.145) (0.312)
City-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes No No
City-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,676 23,333 7,343
R2 0.851 0.827 0.861
Note: ∗p<0.1 ∗∗p<0.05 ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroskedastiikty-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city
The estimate of α captures the log of SO2 emissions in the whole sample and in the sub-
sample of TCZ and non-TCZ cities before the policy was implemented. If the parallel trend
assumption holds, the coefficient α should not be significant before 2006. Table 4 reports the
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results. The coefficients are all insignificant at the usual levels before the treatment year,
validating the parallel trend assumption. In the two remaining columns, we split our sample
between TCZ cities (column 2) and non-TCZ cities (column 3). In column 2, the coefficients
for TCZ cities are negative and significant only in 2007, suggesting the early effect of the
policy immediately one year after its introduction. By contrast, the policy did not affect
the cities not targeted by the control policies (non-TCZ cities in column 3). Estimates are
obtained from specifications that control for output, fixed assets and employment.
5.3 Robustness checks
Table 5 provides evidence that our results are robust with the inclusion of extra city controls.
We consider two additional controls: Special Policies Zone (SPZ) cities and the proximity to
the sea which can blur the effect we are interested in (namely the effect of the TCZ policy
for private firms versus SOEs).
’Go West’ refers to a strategy launched in 2000, when the Chinese government decided to
boost the economy of the western areas by pouring billions of US dollars into infrastructure,
roads, facilities, and improving the skills of the workers (Chen et al., 2018). This strategy
provides incentives to firms, and more particularly, SOEs to downsize the production in
favour of these new (attractive) cities located in China’s Western hinterlands. We consider
Coastali which is one if city i is away from the hinterland and close to the sea, which has
historically always been a very attractive area.
The other policy is called SPZ. It aims at boosting the attractiveness of SPZ cities for
foreign firms, exporters, or high tech firms, which benefit from lower taxes, access to cheaper
credits, or subsidies, amongst others (Wang and Wei, 2008; Hering and Poncet, 2014)13. We
define SPZi equal to one if city i belongs to the SPZ. In our sample we have 59 SPZ cities,
13Those SPZ include High-technology Industry Development Areas, Economic and Technological Devel-
opment Areas, and Export Processing Zones
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and 35 cities adjacent to the sea.
Table 5: Soft budget constraint as reflected in the SOEs’ reaction to the SPZs’
and coastal area’s policies in China
The Dependent variable: Ln SO2ikt
Output Capital Labour
(1) (2) (3)
TCZi × Period× Pollutingk −0.320∗∗ −0.331∗∗ −0.378∗∗
(0.145) (0.155) (0.160)
SPZi × Period× Pollutingk 0.070 0.004 0.019
(0.147) (0.155) (0.161)
Coastali × Period× Pollutingk −0.034 −0.034 −0.044
(0.150) (0.153) (0.161)
TCZi × Period× Pollutingk × output share SOEk 1.305∗
(0.749)
SPZi × Period× Pollutingk × output share SOEk 0.300
(0.689)
Coastali × Period× Pollutingk × output share SOEk −0.327
(0.774)
TCZi × Period× Pollutingk × capital share SOEk 0.924
(0.595)
SPZi × Period× Pollutingk × capital share SOEk 0.477
(0.544)
Coastali × Period× Pollutingk × capital share SOEk −0.150
(0.559)
TCZi × Period× Pollutingk × labour share SOEk 1.391∗
(0.725)
SPZi × Period× Pollutingk × labour share SOEk 0.525
(0.666)
Coastali × Period× Pollutingk × labour share SOEk −0.142
(0.723)
City-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
City-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,676 30,676 30,676
R2 0.851 0.851 0.852
Note: ∗p<0.1 ∗∗p<0.05 ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroskedastiikty-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city
We add to our baseline equation the interaction between the TCZ policy, the post-
treatment dummy (Period) and separately SPZi, and Coastali. We also interact SPZi
19
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2020.02
and Coastali with our proxy for the industrial firm’s ownership. None of the newly added
interaction terms affect our coefficients of interest: the effect of the new environmental system
in the TCZ cities remains robust across the different specifications (columns 1 to 3). More
importantly, it is less effective in sectors with a large share of SOEs (as suggested by the
coefficients of Polluting sectors k × Period × Share SOE k).
Table 6: Environmental policy, Wealth and Population pressure
The Dependent variable: Ln SO2ikt
Output Capital Labour
(1) (2) (3)
Pollutingk × ln gdp per capit −0.034 −0.029 −0.036
(0.298) (0.298) (0.297)
Pollutingk × ln populationit 0.170 0.172 0.172
(0.228) (0.228) (0.228)
TCZi × Period× Pollutingk −0.280∗∗ −0.317∗∗ −0.360∗∗
(0.142) (0.151) (0.156)
TCZi × Period× output share SOEk −0.842
(0.574)
TCZi × Period× Pollutingk × output share SOEk 1.327∗
(0.731)
TCZi × Period× capital share SOEk −0.707
(0.438)
TCZi × Period× Pollutingk × capital share SOEk 1.074∗
(0.577)
TCZi × Period× labour share SOEk −1.044∗
(0.562)
TCZi × Period× Pollutingk × labour share SOEk 1.545∗∗
(0.709)
City-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
City-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,195 30,195 30,195
R2 0.852 0.852 0.852
Note: ∗p<0.1 ∗∗p<0.05 ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroskedastiikty-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city
In Table 6, we address the concern of the correlation between the wealth of the inhabitants
and the sensitivity to the environment. Empirical evidence about this correlation is extensive
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and is widely reported in the literature: wealthier households have the financial capacity to
consume in line with their preferences for goods and services that protect the environment
(Berger, 2019; Chen et al., 2018), they can escape from polluted cities (Chen et al., 2017).
Also, the congestion effect puts pressure on the price of land, input, rent, and labour costs,
harming the most vulnerable and less profitable firms (Fujita and Thisse, 2013; Guimara˜es
et al., 2000), which may not have the option to relocate to where the cost of inputs is cheaper.
To address these concerns, we add in our specification the interaction ln gdp per capit and
ln populationit times the dummy Pollutingk. There is a slight drop in observations because
of some missing values of GDP per capita. The two coefficients of interest remain stable and
significant, stating that the effect of the regulation is robust, the reaction of private firms is
stronger and that of SOEs is weaker.
Finally, we test whether our results hold when we run separate regressions for two different
subsamples. The first sample contains firms belonging to sectors dominated by SOEs and the
second sample includes firms belonging to sectors dominated by private firms. We define the
sectors with an above-average SOEs industrial share of output, capital, or labour as being
dominated by SOEs14. Our sample gathers 92 four-digit industries dominated by SOEs when
computed with the output share, 104 with the capital share, and 98 with the labour share.
Panel A in Table 7 validates our assumption – SOEs are not affected by environmental
policies. As in the previous tables, the triple interaction term is negative but not significant.
However, as reported in Panel B, the regulation effect is negative and significant for industries
dominated by private ownership.
14The average SOE’s share of output is equal to 0.14, capital is equal to 0.22 and labour is 0.19
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Table 7: State versus private sectors
Panel A: SOE Dominating sectors
The Dependent variable: Ln SO2ikt
(1) (2) (3)
(Output) (Capital) (Labour)
TCZi × Pollutingk × Period 0.101 0.114 0.235
(0.234) (0.229) (0.232)
City-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
City-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,824 10,423 10,076
Number sectors 92 104 98
R2 0.865 0.869 0.862
Panel B: Private Dominating sectors
The Dependent variable: LnSO2ikt
(1) (2) (3)
(Output) (Capital) (Labour)
TCZi × Pollutingk × Period −0.243∗∗ −0.272∗∗ −0.284∗∗
(0.124) (0.124) (0.125)
City-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
City-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,852 20,253 20,600
Number sectors 204 192 198
R2 0.857 0.853 0.858
Note: ∗p<0.1 ∗∗p<0.05 ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroskedastiikty-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city
6 Diffusion channels: new administrative regulations
and TFP
Two diffusion channels are scrutinised in this section: first the SO2 pollution reduction guide-
line provided by the central government that aligns the motivations of the bureaucrats with
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the environmental policy; second the investment in technological performance induced by
the environmental policy, which is reflected in the causality running from the environmental
policy to total factor productivity (TFP).
6.1 New incentives to the bureaucrats: the TCZ policy
Throughout the 10th FYP, the environmental policy was seen as a failure, as it led to a sharp
increase in SO2 emissions in 2005, as compared with the 2001 level. The lack of cohesion
between the central government objectives and environmental law enforcement at the local
level was seen as one reason behind this failure. In 2005, the central government decided to
introduce environmental performance indicators to balance the trade-off of growth vs. the
emissions’ reduction goal.
The literature has provided extensive research on the motivations of bureaucrats to im-
plement a policy. Dewatripont et al. (1999, 2000); Alesina and Tabellini (2007) are among
the first to argue that the features of the mandated tasks largely drive bureaucrats’ perfor-
mance and efforts. The missions must be embedded in a precise interpretation scheme and
be linked to performance measures. According to Alesina and Tabellini (2008), bureaucrats
choose their effort level according to two parameters: a concrete objective to reach and the
weight of each task in the likelihood to move up the hierarchical leadership ladder.
In 2006, the central government provided a clear SO2 pollution reduction guideline for
the provinces in China, called the TCZ policy, which the government used to deepen its
political ties with the local cadres and to guarantee the fulfillment of the pollution reduction
targets. The document stipulated that the provincial leaders had a binding contract with
the Ministry of Environment and would bear the responsibility for any failure. Since the
guideline and the reduction mandates are not available at the city i level, but at the provincial
level, we apply the following formula:
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∆SO2i,05−10 = ∆SO2p,05−10 ×
29∑
k=1
µk
output value of industry k in city i
output value of industry k in province p
(3)
where i stands for city, p for province and k for the two-digit industry. The left-hand
side of the formula evaluates how much a city should reduce its SO2 emissions by between
the years 2005 and 2010, and is expressed in 10,000 tonnes. For instance, according to the
information available, the province of Shanghai is expected to reduce its SO2 emissions by
13,000 tonnes over the period 2005-2010.
∆SO2p,05−10 refers to the official mandate at the provincial level and is expressed in
10,000 tonnes. It is available for the 31 provinces of China and for two years, 2005 and 2010.∑29
k=1 µk
output value of industry k in city i
output value of industry k in province p
is the share of industrial production k, in city i over
the total output of k in province p. The weight, µk reflect each k industry’s contribution to
the total industrial SO2 emissions15.
Not surprisingly, the decrease in SO2 emissions required in an average TCZ city is sig-
nificantly higher: 1,600 tonnes, but only 600 for an average non-TCZ city.
To estimate the impact of the new administrative regulations on the logarithm of SO2
emissions, we estimate equation 4, similar to equation 1, where we replace the TCZi variable
by the city reduction mandate, targeti.
Log SO2 emission ikt =α( Period × Targeti × Polluting sectors k)
+νik + λit + φkt + ikt
(4)
We assume that the environmental regulation was efficient in putting significant pressure
on the bureaucrats, especially in TCZ cities. Our assumption is validated: the triple interac-
tion term is negative and strongly significant in TCZ cities (Column 1, Table 8), while still
negative but insignificant in non-TCZ cities (Column 2, Table 8).
15We use the ASIF survey data to construct output share by industry for all the 298 cities of our dataset.
The SO2 industry share is measured from the MEP dataset using the year 2005. Table 13 available in the
appendix
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Table 8: The effectiveness of TCZ’s policy-induced incentives to the bureaucrats
The Dependent variable: Ln SO2ikt
(1) (2)
(TCZ) (No TCZ)
Period× targeti × Pollutingk −0.413∗∗∗ −1.415
(0.141) (1.672)
City-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes
City-industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 23,333 7,343
R2 0.847 0.892
Note: ∗p<0.1 ∗∗p<0.05 ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroskedastiikty-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city
6.2 TFP improvement and pollution abatement in SOEs versus
private firms: the soft budget constraint at work
There is a large body of literature showing that Chinese SOEs report lower economic perfor-
mances (Zhang, 2004; Dougherty et al., 2007; Qian and Roland, 1996). Indeed the objective
function is not focused on profit maximisation, and the soft budget constraint implies that
other emphases are put on competing objectives such as employment, social protection and
incumbent protection, taking away from productivity improvement. As pollution decreases
alongside productivity improvement, one reason behind the ineffectiveness of the new policy
may be the so-called soft budget constraint faced by SOEs (Cole et al., 2008).
The evidence about the correlation between pollution abatement on one hand and pro-
ductivity (scale economy and innovation) on the other hand is considerable (Andersen, 2016,
2017; Cole et al., 2008). The rationale is straightforward: innovation aims at producing at a
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lower cost, allowing companies to use fewer inputs, and less dirty energy per unit of output.
By imposing a lower strict limit for the emission of pollutants, the new regulation forces the
firms to upgrade or leave the market (rationalisation effect, Cole et al. (2008)). However,
this mechanism only works for private firms, whereas SOEs are bailed out.
To test this assumption, we estimate the following equations:
TFPfikt =α(TCZi × Polluting sectors k × Period ) + νik + λit + φkt + ikt (5)
TFPfikt =α(SPZi × Polluting sectors k × Period ) + νik + λit + φkt + ikt (6)
TFPfikt =α(Coastali × Polluting sectors k × Period ) + νik + λit + φkt + ikt (7)
Where the dependent variable TFP fikt is the firm’s productivity level computed with
the Olley–Pakes algorithm (Olley and Pakes, 1996) at the city-industry-time-firm level. The
right-hand side variables have been defined previously: TCZi and SPZi. We add Coastali
which is set equal to one in a subset of cities having different tax and industrial policies.
Coastali is therefore a proxy for the ’Go West’ strategy launched in the year 2000 by the
government.
We control for city-time (λit), industry-time (φkt), and finally city-industry φik fixed
effects.
The coefficient of interest is α. To evidence the soft budget constraint at work, we run
equation 5 in two different subsamples: SOEs versus private firms. Because of the soft
budget constraint, which allows SOEs to bypass the environmental regulation, non-state
firms should respond more vigorously. We, therefore, expect α to be positive for all firms,
but lower for SOEs. We subsequently use two proxies for the environmental policies: SPZ
and TCZ, and in the last columns, we control for the Go West strategy, which aims at
improving firms’ productivity and growth potential.
Table 9 shows the results. Columns 1 and 2 validate our assumption that the new
26
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2020.02
T
a
b
le
9
:
F
ig
ht
in
g
ag
ai
ns
t
p
ol
lu
ti
on
vi
a
pr
o
du
ct
iv
it
y
im
pr
ov
em
en
t:
S
O
E
s
ve
rs
us
pr
iv
at
e
fi
rm
s
T
h
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
:
L
n
S
O
2 i
k
t
(S
O
E
)
(P
R
IV
A
T
E
)
(S
O
E
)
(P
R
IV
A
T
E
)
(S
O
E
)
(P
R
IV
A
T
E
)
(S
O
E
)
(P
R
IV
A
T
E
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
T
C
Z
c
×
P
ol
lu
ti
n
g i
×
P
er
io
d
0.
50
6∗
∗
0.
53
6∗
∗∗
0.
00
5
0.
34
5∗
∗∗
(0
.2
05
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.2
13
)
(0
.1
11
)
S
P
Z
c
×
P
ol
lu
ti
n
g i
×
P
er
io
d
0.
07
0∗
∗∗
0.
14
7∗
∗∗
0.
07
0∗
∗∗
0.
14
7∗
∗∗
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
01
)
C
oa
st
a
l c
×
P
ol
lu
ti
n
g i
×
P
er
io
d
0.
51
3∗
∗∗
0.
38
2∗
∗∗
0.
51
0∗
∗∗
0.
19
1∗
(0
.1
59
)
(0
.1
16
)
(0
.1
71
)
(0
.1
12
)
C
it
y
-y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
d
u
st
ry
-y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
it
y
-i
n
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
2,
41
5
34
,4
37
2,
41
5
34
,4
37
2,
41
5
34
,4
37
2,
41
5
34
,4
37
R
2
0.
48
2
0.
10
4
0.
48
1
0.
10
3
0.
48
2
0.
10
4
0.
48
2
0.
10
4
N
ot
e:
∗ p
<
0.
1
∗∗
p
<
0.
05
∗∗
∗ p
<
0.
01
H
et
er
os
k
ed
as
ti
ik
ty
-r
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
ci
ty
27
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2020.02
regulation in TCZ cities has increased the average private firms’ productivity in the most
polluting industries, and, to a lesser extent, the productivity of SOEs. The difference is
significant, although small. It becomes larger when the environmental policy is proxied by
SPZ with (columns 3–4) and without (columns 5–6) controlling for Coastal, which captures
the effect of the Go West policy. Interestingly, SOEs seem to be more efficient in augmenting
their TFP than private firms under the Go West strategy, as reflected in both columns 5–6
and 7–8.
7 Conclusion
The concept of the SBC introduced by Kornai 1993 is a very fruitful concept that can be
applied to a wide range of situations, beyond simple transition economics and economics of
socialism. Vahabi 2001; 2014 summarizes these situations, which include many cases of soft
budget constraints in market economies. This paper investigates one such situation, namely
the case of SOEs, which do not restructure in reaction to the introduction of a new set of
stringent environmental regulations.
The empirical analysis is rooted in a unique and rich dataset provided by the Ministry
of Environmental Protection (MEP) and by the State Environmental Protection Agency
(SEPA), which collect the main data source of pollutants and wastes in China since 1980.
The triple difference in difference identification strategy allows us to quantify the effect of
environmental regulation on firms’ emissions of pollution. We distinguish private firms and
SOEs, and we find that the environmental policy’s effect is smaller by 42% for the latter.
Chinese SOEs do not restructure because the environmentally induced budget constraint
hardening does not constrain them and, yet, they nevertheless benefit from the SBC.
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Table 10: TCZ and SPZ cities in China
Province City Code TCZ SPZ Province City Code TCZ SPZ
Anhui Hefei 3401 0 0 Guangdong Shanwei 4415 1 1
Anhui Wuhu 3402 1 0 Guangdong Heyuan 4416 0 1
Anhui Bengbu 3403 0 0 Guangdong Yangjiang 4417 0 1
Anhui Huainan 3404 0 0 Guangdong Qingyuan 4418 1 1
Anhui Maanshan 3405 1 0 Guangdong Dongguan 4419 1 1
Anhui Huaibei 3406 0 0 Guangdong Zhongshan 4420 1 1
Anhui Tongling 3407 1 0 Guangdong Chaozhou 4421 1 1
Anhui Anqing 3408 0 0 Guangdong Jieyang 4424 1 1
Anhui Huangshan 3409 1 0 Guangxi Nanning 4501 1 1
Anhui Fuyang 3412 0 0 Guangxi Liuzhou 4502 1 1
Anhui Liuan 3415 0 0 Guangxi Guilin 4503 1 1
Anhui Xuancheng 3418 1 0 Guangxi Wuzhou 4504 1 1
Anhui Chizhou 3417 0 0 Guangxi Beihai 4505 0 1
Beijing Beijing 1101 1 1 Guangxi Yulin 4506 1 1
Chongqing Chongqing 5001 1 1 Guangxi Baise 4510 0 1
Fujian Fuzhou 3501 1 1 Guangxi Hechi 4508 1 1
Fujian Xiamen 3502 1 1 Guangxi Qinzhou 4509 0 1
Fujian Putian 3503 0 1 Guangxi Fangchenggang 4512 0 1
Fujian Sanming 3504 1 1 Guangxi Guigang 4513 1 1
Fujian Quanzhou 3505 1 1 Guangxi Hezhou 4516 1 1
Fujian Zhangzhou 3506 1 1 Guizhou Guiyang 5201 1 1
Fujian Nanping 3507 0 1 Guizhou Liupanshui 5202 0 1
Fujian Ningde 3508 0 1 Guizhou Zunyi 5203 1 1
Fujian Longyan 3509 1 1 Guizhou Anshun 5207 1 1
Gansu Lanzhou 6201 1 1 Hainan Haikou 4601 0 0
Gansu Jiayuguan 6202 0 1 Hebei Shijiazhuang 1301 1 1
Gansu Jinchang 6203 1 1 Hebei Tangshan 1302 1 1
Gansu Baiyin 6204 1 1 Hebei Qinhuangdao 1303 0 1
Gansu Tianshui 6205 0 1 Hebei Handan 1304 1 1
Gansu Jiuquan 6206 0 1 Hebei Xingtai 1305 1 1
Gansu Zhangye 6207 1 1 Hebei Baoding 1306 1 1
Gansu Wuwei 6208 0 1 Hebei Zhangjiakou 1307 1 1
Gansu Dingxin 6209 0 1 Hebei Chengde 1308 1 1
Gansu Longnann 6210 0 1 Hebei Cangzhou 1309 0 1
Gansu Pingliang 6211 0 1 Hebei Langfang 1310 0 1
Gansu Qingyangn 6212 0 1 Hebei Hengshui 1311 1 1
Guangdong Guangzhou 4401 1 1 Heilongjiang Harbin 2301 0 0
Guangdong Shaoguan 4402 1 1 Heilongjiang Qiqihar 2302 0 0
Guangdong Shenzhen 4403 1 1 Heilongjiang Jixi 2303 0 0
Guangdong Zhuhai 4404 1 1 Heilongjiang Hegang 2304 0 0
Guangdong Shantou 4405 1 1 Heilongjiang Shuangyashan 2305 0 0
Guangdong Foshan 4406 1 1 Heilongjiang Daqing 2306 0 0
Guangdong Jiangmen 4407 1 1 Heilongjiang Yichun 2307 0 0
Guangdong Zhanjiang 4408 1 1 Heilongjiang Jiamusi 2308 0 0
Guangdong Maoming 4409 0 1 Heilongjiang Qitaihe 2309 0 0
Guangdong Zhaoqing 4412 1 1 Heilongjiang Mudanjiang 2310 0 0
Guangdong Huizhou 4413 1 1 Heilongjiang Heihe 2311 0 0
Guangdong Meizhou 4414 0 1 Heilongjiang Suihua 2314 0 0
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Table 11: TCZ and SPZ cities in China (continued)
Province City geocode4 corr TCZ SPZ Province City geocode4 corr TCZ SPZ
Henan Zhengzhou 4101 1 1 Jiangsu Xuzhou 3203 1 1
Henan Kaifeng 4102 0 1 Jiangsu Changzhou 3204 1 1
Henan Luoyang 4103 1 1 Jiangsu Suzhou 3205 1 1
Henan Pingdingshan 4104 0 1 Jiangsu Nantong 3206 1 1
Henan Anyang 4105 1 1 Jiangsu Lianyungang 3207 0 1
Henan Hebi 4106 0 1 Jiangsu Yancheng 3209 0 1
Henan Xinxiang 4107 0 1 Jiangsu Yangzhou 3210 1 1
Henan Jiaozuo 4108 1 1 Jiangsu Zhenjiang 3211 1 1
Henan Puyang 4109 0 1 Jiangsu Taizhou 3212 1 1
Henan Xuchang 4110 0 1 Jiangsu Suqian 3217 0 1
Henan Luohe 4111 0 1 Jiangsu Huaian 3221 0 1
Henan Sanmenxia 4112 1 1 Jiangxi Nanchang 3601 1 1
Henan Shangqiu 4113 0 1 Jiangxi Jingdezhen 3602 0 1
Henan Zhoukou 4114 0 1 Jiangxi Pingxiang 3603 1 1
Henan Zhumadian 4115 0 1 Jiangxi Jiujiang 3604 1 1
Henan Nanyang 4116 0 1 Jiangxi Xinyu 3605 0 1
Henan Xinyangn 4117 0 1 Jiangxi Yingtan 3606 1 1
Hubei Wuhan 4201 1 1 Jiangxi Ganzhoun 3607 1 1
Hubei Huangshi 4202 1 1 Jiangxi Yichun 3608 0 1
Hubei Shiyan 4203 0 1 Jiangxi Shangrao 3609 0 1
Hubei Yichang 4205 1 1 Jiangxi Jian 3610 1 1
Hubei Xiangfan 4206 0 1 Jiangxi Fuzhou 3611 1 1
Hubei Ezhou 4207 1 1 Jilin Changchun 2201 0 0
Hubei Jingmen 4208 1 1 Jilin Jilin 2202 1 0
Hubei Huanggang 4209 0 1 Jilin Siping 2203 1 0
Hubei Xiaogan 4210 0 1 Jilin Liaoyuan 2204 0 0
Hubei Xianning 4211 1 1 Jilin Tonghua 2205 1 0
Hubei Jingzhou 4212 1 1 Jilin Baicheng 2209 0 0
Hubei Suizhou 4215 0 1 Liaoning Shenyang 2101 1 1
Hunan Changsha 4301 1 1 Liaoning Dalian 2102 1 1
Hunan Zhuzhou 4302 1 1 Liaoning Anshan 2103 1 1
Hunan Xiangtan 4303 1 1 Liaoning Fushun 2104 1 1
Hunan Hengyang 4304 1 1 Liaoning Benxi 2105 1 1
Hunan Shaoyang 4305 0 1 Liaoning Dandong 2106 0 1
Hunan Yueyang 4306 1 1 Liaoning Jinzhou 2107 1 1
Hunan Changde 4307 1 1 Liaoning Yingkou 2108 0 1
Hunan Yiyang 4309 1 1 Liaoning Fuxin 2109 1 1
Hunan Loudin 4310 1 1 Liaoning Liaoyang 2110 1 1
Hunan Chenzhou 4311 1 1 Liaoning Panjin 2111 0 1
Hunan Huaihua 4312 1 1 Liaoning Tieling 2112 0 1
Inner Mongolia Hohhot 1501 1 1 Liaoning Chaoyang 2113 0 1
Inner Mongolia Baotou 1502 1 1 Ningxia Yinchuan 6401 1 1
Inner Mongolia Wuhai 1503 1 1 Ningxia Shizuishan 6402 1 1
Inner Mongolia Chifeng 1504 1 1 Ningxia Guyuann 6404 0 1
Inner Mongolia Hulunbeirn 1507 0 1 Qinghai Xining 6301 0 0
Inner Mongolia Ulanqabn 1510 0 1 Shaanxi Xian 6101 1 1
Inner Mongolia Bayannaoern 1511 0 1 Shaanxi Tongchuan 6102 1 1
Jiangsu Nanjing 3201 1 1 Shaanxi Baoji 6103 0 1
Jiangsu Wuxi 3202 1 1 Shaanxi Xianyang 6104 0 1
33
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2020.02
Table 12: TCZ and SPZ cities in China (continued)
Province City geocode4 corr TCZ SPZ Province City geocode4 corr TCZ SPZ
Shaanxi Weinan 6105 1 1 Xinjiang Karamay 6502 0 1
Shaanxi Hanzhong 6106 0 1 Yunnan Kunming 5301 1 1
Shaanxi Ankang 6107 0 1 Yunnan Zhaotong 5306 1 1
Shaanxi Shangluon 6108 1 1 Yunnan Qujing 5303 1 1
Shaanxi Yanan 6109 0 1 Yunnan Simaon 5309 0 1
Shaanxi Yulinn 6110 0 1 Yunnan Baoshan 5312 0 1
Shandong Jinan 3701 1 1 Yunnan Lijiangn 5314 0 1
Shandong Qingdao 3702 1 1 Yunnan Lincangn 5317 0 1
Shandong Zibo 3703 1 1 Zhejiang Hangzhou 3301 1 1
Shandong Zaozhuang 3704 1 1 Zhejiang Ningbo 3302 1 1
Shandong Dongying 3705 0 1 Zhejiang Wenzhou 3303 1 1
Shandong Yantai 3706 1 1 Zhejiang Jiaxing 3304 1 1
Shandong Weifang 3707 1 1 Zhejiang Huzhou 3305 1 1
Shandong Jining 3708 1 1 Zhejiang Shaoxing 3306 1 1
Shandong Taian 3709 1 1 Zhejiang Jinhua 3307 1 1
Shandong Weihai 3710 0 1 Zhejiang Quzhou 3308 1 1
Shandong Rizhao 3711 0 1 Zhejiang Zhoushan 3309 0 1
Shandong Liaocheng 3714 0 1 Zhejiang Lishui 3310 0 1
Shandong Linyi 3713 0 1 Zhejiang Taizhou 3311 1 1
Shandong Heze 3717 0 1
Shandong Laiwu 3720 1 1
Shanghai Shanghai 3101 1 1
Shanxi Taiyuan 1401 1 1
Shanxi Datong 1402 1 1
Shanxi Yangquan 1403 1 1
Shanxi Changzhi 1404 0 1
Shanxi Jincheng 1405 0 1
Shanxi Shuozhou 1406 1 1
Shanxi Xinzhou 1408 1 1
Shanxi Luliangn 1409 0 1
Shanxi Jinzhong 1417 1 1
Shanxi Linfen 1410 1 1
Shanxi Yuncheng 1412 1 1
Sichuan Chengdu 5101 1 1
Sichuan Zigong 5103 1 1
Sichuan Panzhihua 5104 1 1
Sichuan Luzhou 5105 1 1
Sichuan Deyang 5106 1 1
Sichuan Mianyang 5107 1 1
Sichuan Guangyuan 5108 0 1
Sichuan Suining 5109 1 1
Sichuan Neijiang 5110 1 1
Sichuan Leshan 5111 1 1
Sichuan Yibin 5114 1 1
Sichuan Nanchong 5113 1 1
Sichuan Yaan 5118 0 1
Sichuan Guangan 5122 1 1
Tianjin Tianjin 1201 1 1
Xinjiang Urumqi 6501 1 1
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Table 13: SO2 Industry share, 2005
CIC Value
Non-metallic Mineral Products 31 0.2340
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 32 0.1983
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 26 0.1611
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear Fuel 25 0.0910
Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 33 0.0855
Paper and Paper Products 22 0.0577
Textile 17 0.0407
Chemical Fibers 28 0.0222
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 13 0.0199
Beverages 15 0.0130
Foods 14 0.0123
Medicines 27 0.0089
General Purpose Machinery 35 0.0089
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood,Bamboo, Rattan, Palm, and Straw Products 20 0.0065
Rubber 29 0.0063
Transport Equipment 37 0.0061
Special Purpose Machinery 36 0.0050
Electrical Machinery and Equipment 39 0.0038
Metal Products 34 0.0037
Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 19 0.0029
Communication Equipment, Computers and Other Electronic Equipment 40 0.0025
Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps 18 0.0022
Measuring Instruments and Machinery for Cultural Activity and Office Work 41 0.0020
Plastics 30 0.0018
Tobacco 16 0.0016
Artwork and Other Manufacturing 42 0.0007
Furniture 21 0.0006
Articles For Culture, Education and Sport Activity 24 0.0004
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 23 0.0004
The share is computed for 28 industries.
Source: MEP dataset. Author’s own computation
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